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According to the hierarchical model of sensory information processing, sensory inputs are
transmitted to cortical areas, which are crucial for complex auditory and speech processing, only
after being processed in subcortical areas (Hickok and Poeppel, 2007; Rauschecker and Scott, 2009).
However, studies using electroencephalography (EEG) indicate that distinguishing simultaneous
auditory inputs involves a widely distributed neural network, including the medial temporal lobe,
which is essential for declarative memory, and posterior association cortices (Alain et al., 2001;
Squire et al., 2004). More recent studies have even demonstrated plasticity of auditory signals as
low as the brainstem (Suga, 2008). Collectively, studies suggest that the functional architecture of
perceptual processing involves primarily top-down modulation (Suga et al., 2002; Gilbert and Li,
2013; Chandrasekaran et al., 2014). Top-down influences exerted throughout the auditory systems
(Lotto and Holt, 2011) include: memory (Goldinger, 1998)1, attention (Choi et al., 2014), which
has been found to modulate auditory encoding in the cochlea, a subcortical area (Maison et al.,
2001), (prior) knowledge of syntax or words (Ganong, 1980; Warren, 1984)2, and experience-
based expectations pertaining to the speaker’s accent (Deutsch, 1996; Deutsch et al., 2004; Irino
and Patterson, 2006), gender (Johnson et al., 1999), and vocal folds or tract (Irino and Patterson,
2002; Patterson and Johnsrude, 2008).
While a great deal has been written about the issue of cognitive penetrability in the case of vision,
audition has received almost no attention. For example, a corresponding body of evidence for top-
downmodulation in vision has been used to undermine the Cognitive Impenetrability Thesis (CIT)
(see Macpherson, 2012; Siegel, 2012; Wu, 2013; Cecchi, 2014). Brogaard and Gatzia (in press) have
argued that top-downmodulation on visual processes involving prior-knowledge, experience based
expectation, or memory do not threaten the CIT, even after acknowledging that such influences
are cognitive in nature (see also Pylyshyn, 1999; Raftopoulos, 2001). The reason is that such top-
down influences, although cognitive in nature, are distinct from discursive thoughts that stand
in a semantically-coherent relation to the phenomenology or content of experience, for instance,
thoughts proceeding by argumentation or reasoning rather than by intuition or implicit hypothesis
internal to the visual system3. If we insisted that instances of top-down modulation be counted as
instances of cognitive penetration, the debate about cognitive penetrability would be trivial and,
hence, unmotivated since studies clearly indicate that such top-down modulation in visual (or
auditory) perception is extensive. A similar argument can be made in the case of audition.
1It has been suggested that the mechanism underlying auditory restoration (the auditory system’s ability to compensate for
expected missing sounds, see Warren, 1984) involves episodic memory, which involves memory traces left by an experience
that are activated, according to the similarity with the stimulus, when a new stimulus such as a word is heard (see Goldinger,
1998).
2As the Ganong effect illustrates, phonemes such as /t/ or /d/ tend to be heard as /t/ when followed by “ask” to form “task”
but as /d/ when followed by “usk” to form “dusk.”
3Constancy computations, for example, are not obligatorily linked to experiencing sensibles and may precede it (Kentridge
et al., 2014).
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The CIT has traditionally been understood as a semantic
thesis. Accordingly, the information a system computes is not
sensitive (in a semantically-coherent way) to one’s cognitive states
and cannot be altered in a way that bears a logical relation to one’s
knowledge or reasons (Pylyshyn, 1984, 1999; Raftopoulos, 2009).
For example, suppose that you experience a sound as /da-da/ and
that causes you to form the belief that the sound is /da-da/. In this
case, your belief and your auditory experience are semantically
coherent: they have roughly the same content. Suppose now that
you acquire the belief that the sound is in fact /ba-ba/ (say,
because you have now come to believe that the Cartesian evil
genius has made you hear it as /da-da/ when it is in fact a /ba-ba/
sound). According to the semantic thesis, your newly acquired
belief, for which you may have ample justification, cannot alter
the content computed by your auditory system; you will continue
to experience the sound as /da-da/ despite that you have come
to believe that it is /ba-ba/. Some proponents of the semantic
thesis have argued that changes to the information a system
computes are attributed to intra-perceptual principles that do not
conform to standard tenets of rationality, such as standard rules
of logic, probability theory and statistics, or rational choice theory
(Brogaard and Gatzia, in press).
Undermining the CIT requires demonstrating that changes
in the phenomenology of one’s auditory perception are due to
the listener’s discursive or rational thoughts that stand in the
right sort of semantic relation to her experience. So it is not
enough that discursive thoughts influence experience; they must
do so in a semantically-coherent way. Consider ventriloquism,
for example. Suppose that I believe that the puppet is not actually
producing the sounds (the person holding the puppet is) but I
nevertheless hear the speech as coming from the puppet’s mouth.
In this case, the content of my belief differs from the content
as my auditory experience. Now suppose that my discursive
thoughts about what really goes on in the case of ventriloquism
gives rise to a stress reaction in me (for some reason) and that
this mood (the stress) changes the content of my experience: I
no longer hear the speech as coming from the puppet. In this
case, it may appear that my discursive thoughts have changed
my auditory experience in a semantically-coherent way: my
belief and my experience now have the same content. However,
by hypothesis, it is the mood, not my beliefs, that changed
my auditory experience. Since moods, unlike beliefs, have no
contents, the stress (a mood) cannot have the same content as
either my belief or my auditory experience. The content of my
experience has thus changed but not in a semantically-coherent
way. This semantic-coherence has to be involved in every step of
the process for changes in phenomenology to threaten the CIT.
For example, if my belief that the puppet is not actually producing
the sounds were to causeme to no longer experience the speech as
coming from the puppet via a chain of logically related processes,
then the content of my belief would have changed the content of
my experience in a semantically coherent-way. Such a case would
indeed threaten the CIT.
Additionally, cases that involve the indirect influencing of
auditory experience by beliefs (or discursive thoughts) need
not threaten the CIT. For example, Fodor (1988) jokingly said
that his heart is cognitively “penetrated” by his intention to do
calisthenics since it results in doing calisthenics, resulting in his
heart rate increasing.What this joke illustrates is that the locution
“receives input from” is not transitive, meaning that it is not the
case that if a process B receives input from A, and C received
input from B that C receives input from A since it is possible that
none of B’s outputs that were responses to inputs from A affected
C (Lyons, 2015).
Cases of perceptual learning involve such indirect influencing
of auditory perception. Typically, perceptual learning refers to
the brain’s plasticity, i.e., the gradual structural or functional
changes in the connectivity of sensory systems resulting from
training consisting of repeated exposure to particular stimuli
(Roelfsema et al., 2010). However, the competition between
verbal and implicit systems (COVIS) model suggests a dual-
system framework, according to which learners, in information-
integration tasks, initially use the reflective (rule-based) system,
but switch to the reflexive (information-integration) system
with practice (Maddox et al., 2013; Valentin et al., 2014)4. The
fact that the reflective system is mediated by the prefrontal
cortex and involves hypothesis testing by the learner seems
to suggest that at least some cases of perceptual learning
may constitute cases of cognitive penetration. This conclusion,
however, is too hasty. The reflexive system is viewed as indirect
and procedural: trial feedbacks reinforce associations of stimuli
located in different regions of perceptual space with specific
motor outputs (Maddox et al., 2013). It follows that the changes
in auditory phenomenology associated with the reflective system
result indirectly from the brain’s plasticity, not directly from
the listener’s discursive thoughts (in a semantically-coherent
way). Perceptual learning, therefore, need not threaten the CIT,
provided that the changes in phenomenology result indirectly
from changes in the brain’s plasticity, which cannot be attributed
to the listener’s discursive thoughts.
Auditory illusions are useful tools to illustrate the inability
of our discursive thoughts to alter the phenomenology of
our auditory experience in a semantically-coherent way. One
example is the tritone illusion. Deutsch (2007) presented listeners
with two tones in succession that are opposite in the positions
along the pitch class space such as G# followed by D or C
followed by F#, which comprised an interval of six semitones
(known as tritone). When one of the pairs was played (say,
G# followed by D) some of the listeners heard a descending
pattern while others heard an ascending pattern. However, when
another pair was played (say, C followed by F#) listeners who had
previously heard a descending pattern now heard an ascending
one and vice versa. The tritone illusion varies in correlation
with the accent of the speaker. For example, while Californians
tended to hear the pattern as ascending, Britons tended to
hear it as descending (Deutsch, 1991). A considerable difference
was also observed between mothers who had grown up in
widely different geographical regions. Perhaps not surprisingly,
significant similarities were observed among these mothers and
their children, even though the children had not grown up in the
same geographic regions as their mothers (Deutsch, 1996).
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on the issue of
perceptual learning.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1166
Brogaard and Gatzia Is the auditory system cognitively penetrable?
The tritone illusion persists even after listeners are informed
that the two tones in succession are opposite in the positions
along the pitch class space, indicating that their discursive
thoughts cannot alter the phenomenology of their auditory
experiences. What one hears depends on the configuration of
one’s auditory system, which is, among other things, subject to
developmental influences (Deutsch et al., 2004). However, top-
down modulation caused by adaptation- or development-based
knowledge, experience-based expectation, memory, or attention
are consistent with the claim that auditory perception is not
cognitively penetrable, at least not in any interesting sense, as the
changes in phenomenology cannot plausibly be attributed to the
listener’s discursive thoughts.
Another example is the McGurk illusion, which arises
when auditory speech cues are presented in synchrony with
incongruent visual speech cues (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976).
For example, when the auditory syllable “ba” is presented in
synchrony with a speaker mouthing “ga,” subjects typically
report hearing “da.” However, when the auditory syllable “ga” is
presented in synchrony with a speaker mouthing “ba,” subjects
typically report hearing “bga”5. As with the tritone illusion, the
McGurk illusion persists even after subjects are informed that
the auditory syllable is “ba” in the first case and “ga” in the
second. Windmann (2004) found that the clarity and, to some
extent, the probability of the illusion was significantly influenced
by the listener’s experience-based expectations, which do not
threaten the CIT for the same reason: the information the system
computes is not altered by the listener’s discursive thoughts.
It may nevertheless be objected that other cases such as sine
wave speech appear to threaten the CIT since they seem to
involve changes in phenomenology which can be attributed to
5Here too it is due to the non-transitivity of the locution “receives input from”
that we cannot say that auditory processing is cognitively penetrated by visual
processing (see Lyons, 2015).
subject’s discursive thoughts6. For example, naive listeners tend
to hear sine wave speech as tones or whistles, rather than
speech. After being familiarized with the linguistic message,
however, many listeners readily hear sine wave as speech (Sheffert
et al., 2002). However, it is not clear, in this case, whether it
is the listener’s beliefs that cause a change in her experience.
For example, it could be that such cases involve cognitive
penetration if the listener’s belief about the content of the
linguistic message were to alter (in a semantically-coherent
way) the phenomenology of the listener’s experience. Or, it
could be that the listener is still hearing the same tones or
whistles but interprets them on the basis of the newly acquired
knowledge of the linguistic message. The more likely explanation
is that it is a case of normalization based on experience-based
expectation given that the listener comes to understand sine
wave speech only after learning its linguistic message. So it
seems that the expectation that the sound has the linguistic
message the listener expects it to have is what is doing all
the work. Indeed, studies suggest that listeners use a range
of information regarding the speaker, including the speaker’s
supposed nationality (Niedzielski, 1999), to create a frame of
reference to be used during perception in order to normalize
what is heard. In other words, listeners utilize adaptation- or
development-based knowledge, experience-based expectation,
memory, or attention to make sense of speech. However, as we
have argued, such changes in phenomenology cannot plausibly
be attributed to the listeners’ discursive thoughts (at least not in a
semantically-coherent way) and, thus, do not threaten the CIT.
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